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The recent emphasis on a realist ontology that cannot be overshadowed by subjectivist
or relativist perspectives seems to have a number of consequences for psychology as
well. My attempt here is to analyse the relationship between happiness as a state of the
individual and the states of the external world and the brain events related to (or, in some
hypotheses, causally responsible for) its occurrence. It can be maintained that different
degrees of realism are suitable to describe the states of happiness and this fact might
have relevant psychological implications, namely for the so-called positive psychology.
This is especially true now that there are methods available to induce subjective states of
happiness unrelated to the external conditions usually taken to be linked to such states.
Keywords: happiness, well-being, realism, positive psychology, happiness satisfaction, positive psychology
intervention, hedonic well-being
INTRODUCTION
The recent emphasis on the inescapable presence of a realist ontology that cannot be overshadowed
by subjectivist or relativist perspectives (e.g., Harman, 2010; Gabriel, 2011; Ferraris, 2014, 2015) has
sparked a debate that has only marginally touched on the field of experimental science. This is due
to the easily understandable reason that the conditions of empirical research, while being mostly
implicit, are entirely realist in the proper and most intuitive sense. If there were no external reality
independent of the knowing mind—a reality that can be investigated insofar as it is accessible by
our senses and our tools, predictable in its change and mostly interpretable according to law-like
regularities—scientific inquiry would be neither practicable nor would it give us knowledge. And
in any case this knowledge would not be effective and practical in the sense of allowing for correct
predictions about future states of the world. Laboratory results seem to constitute the best refutation
of the idea—expressed by Friedrich Nietzsche and attributed to anti-realists in general—that there
are no facts, only interpretations (as Nietzsche wrote in Fragment 481 of The Will to Power).
Yet, the epistemological debate on scientific realism is very complex and is strongly interwoven
with the vicissitudes of the concept of naturalism (De Caro and Macarthur, 2004, 2010). “New
realism” principally states that what exists (ontology) is prioritary and more important than
what we know about what exists (epistemology), and that the real is “unamendable” because it
does not depend on our conceptual schemes or our linguistic practices. And this view easily,
but not always, tends to conflate with scientific naturalism. This is in contrast to the general
postmodern conception that all reality is socially constructed and infinitely manipulable; truth—in
the culturalist perspective—is a useless notion, because solidarity is more important than objectivity
(Ferraris, 2014).
This is the background of the topic that I want to develop here, which is also interesting for its
implications in terms of empirical psychology and practical ethics. My attempt here is to analyse
the relationship between the concept of happiness/well-being—certainly difficult to operationalize,
it should be noted—and the states of the external world and the brain events related to (or, in
some hypotheses, causally responsible for) its occurrence. In fact, outlining the different degrees of
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realism linked to different conception and approaches to
happiness has the (increasingly relevant) purpose of providing
a theoretical and practical guide to assess them in terms of
consistency and of ability to offer the means to deal with the
world as it is. Recent reports, which have gatheredmuch attention
from academia and the media, have tried to move the focus
from the external and objective conditions “causing” happiness
to conditions internal to the individual, which are therefore
subjective and unrelated to states of the world (cf. Davies, 2015).
Such perspective is far from new (there are several
examples of it in the history of philosophy), but today it
appears to be particularly relevant due to the joint action of
theoretical/psychological tools and neuroscientific ones. In a
way, as we shall see, subjective happiness—being measured and
induced by acting on the brain—becomes “objective” for the first
time, thanks to contemporary science. In other words, it is now
referred to a material and manipulable reality. The price to be
paid is that happiness thus seems to be a potentially solipsistic
condition à la “brains in a vat,” completely detached from the
external states of the world as happiness-makers. One condition
is not necessarily better than the other, but to highlight (both
empirically and conceptually) the degrees of realism of these
states of happiness (“natural” vs. induced) and the different
means to produce them seems relevant to evaluate them along
those lines and, consequently, better choose among them. And
that’s what I will try to do in what follows1.
THE DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF
HAPPINESS
The concept of happiness has a philosophical history so
long and complicated that I must necessarily introduce some
simplifications and stipulative definitions, functional to the
present discussion. This should not affect the reasoning to follow,
since happiness will only be discussed in its meanings specified
below, which are at least part of the widely recognized sense of
the word (cf. Haybron, 2011). So, one can distinguish first of
all an evaluative sense of happiness, understood as individual
1It should be noted that by “realism” I mean the adherence to an objective state
of things in the world. In general, realism can be so defined: X, Y, and Z exist, and
the fact that they exist and have specific properties is (ontologically) independent
of our beliefs, perceptions, linguistic practices, and conceptual schemes. Realism
thus implies the existence of a something independently of any subject’s states of
mind. In this sense, “objectivity” can also be used, as it generally expresses the
notion that the quality of being true is not influenced by particular perspectives,
individual or community biases, interpretations, and value commitments. In this
sense, objectivity is an ideal for science as well. The problem here is the extent to
which one can speak of objectivity when describing mental or emotional states
involved in describing happiness and wellbeing. In any case, I prefer to frame
my discussion along the realism/anti-realism disjunction, as the contemporary
philosophical and psychological debate about realism and anti-realism seems to
be more nuanced and to offer some helpful tools. Anti-realism here amounts to
detachment from a state of things in the world independently of specific mental
states and, in some cases, the belief that there is no objective reality to refer to.
Anti-realism concerning happiness is peculiar, in that it doesn’t deny the existence
of a specific class of objective states of the world (the individual cerebral states
underlying the mental states of happiness), but believes (or is committed to the
idea) that such states are unrelated to all other objective states of the world, which
can be instead their causal origins or a comparative reference when assessing
well-being.
well-being, or human flourishing. Then there is a descriptive
sense of happiness, at a psychological level, similar to concepts
that indicate (mental/ brain) states such as “depression” or
“tranquility.”2
Happiness as Well-Being
The first meaning concerns a “prudential value” (to distinguish
it from moral or esthetic values), also called “well-being” or
“utility.” Such a meaning carries with it the idea of positivity
and original preferability: It is better to be happy than to be
unhappy—although there is wide disagreement on what it is to
be happy and what means are legitimate and/or recommended
to achieve this condition3. Happiness in this sense concerns
what benefits an individual, makes her feel better, serves her
interests and goals and, ultimately, is good and desirable for
her. This characterization shows, prima facie, a strong subject-
relative component in that what is good for me may not be good
for you. If our “prudential values” are different, we can derive
happiness from very different experiences. So we may think that
the adventurous life of Richard Branson is what made him happy,
but such life would not be as positive for, say, a monk withdrawn
into the desert, happy to spend his days in meditation. In the
same way, it may be assumed that a life dedicated to financial
speculation is sad and disgraceful, notwithstanding the economic
success it leads to, while those who do that might be extremely
happy about it.
The theories of happiness as well-being can be declined in
three versions: Hedonism, desire theories, and objective list
theories (see Parfit, 1984). The principal thesis is considered to
be that of “hedonism,” whose modern formulation, as is well-
known, can be attributed to Bentham (1789). For him, nature
has placed us under the sovereignty of two masters, pain and
pleasure; and it is only on the basis of such masters—he argues in
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation—that
we decide what we should do. The substantive question of the
well-being implied in hedonism—in other words, when a state
can be considered as a state of happiness?—is answered as
follows: The situation in which the sum of pleasures is greater
than the sum of pains. And the explicative question of what
makes pleasure good (or a good), and pain bad (or an evil) is
answered as follows: It is the pleasantness of pleasure and the
painfulness (unpleasantness) of pain.
The point is that hedonism is about what is good for me.
However, in the case of pleasure, which seems appreciated by
most people, “for me” does not necessarily mean only for me.
In fact, Bentham says that the central aspects of the experiences
of pleasure and pain are their duration and intensity, which
tend to be measurable and comparable intersubjectively. This
formulation of utilitarianism is controversial, but it is not a
matter that should be addressed here; suffice it to say that to
2I will not tackle here the issue whether one needs to distinguish between mental
states and brain neurobiological structures (and if so, what relationship there is
between them, if mere co-presence, correlation, or causality), or whether they fully
coincide (as psychoneural reductionists claim).
3Here and below, I follow Haybron (2011) and Crisp (2008). There are also moral
positions for which we should not give much importance to happiness. I will argue
that this may be related to the degree of realism and anti-realism incorporated in
the different senses of happiness assumed.
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mitigate its most contested aspects (for example, the fact that it
would be consistent with it to prefer to live indefinitely as an
oyster rather than 80 years as a fully realized human), John Stuart
Mill proposed to introduce a third property, “quality,” which is
to distinguish the nature and the preferability of some pleasures
over others.
Desire theory regards obtaining what we aspire to, rather than
the mere occurrence of certain physiological experiences. The
best example can be found in welfare-based economic theories
that see welfare as the satisfaction of preferences, the content
of which is revealed by the individual agents in the market,
who order them according to utility functions. The latter can
be evaluated according to their degree of preference with the
unifying meter of money. Finer distinctions are linked to actual
desires (which may be dysfunctional in the long term) and to
overall desires throughout existence. In any case, this perspective
incorporates a high rate of subjectivism, since preferences
are usually the result of personal biases, individual lives and
idiosyncratic assessments, although influenced by education,
culture and the intersubjective rules to which one is exposed.
Finally, objective list theories, mainly inspired by the
Aristotelian position (see Hurka, 1993), regard the perfecting of
human nature as the cause of eudamonia, a virtuous life that gives
us well-being regardless of our personal dispositions, making
reference to objective goods implied by human nature as such.
The objection is that the list can be filled with everything that
seems to produce well-being for the person in question. Thus,
the supposed objective character of this approach is lost in the
subject-relative dimension of the means that give us well-being.
On the one hand, it’s true that Aristotle seems to list a number
of objective goods; on the other hand the list is actually quite
loose and open-ended. “He is happy who lives in accordance
with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external
goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete
life” (Aristotle, 2000). Indeed, those goods include health, wealth,
knowledge, friends, etc. Moreover, happiness is the exercise of
virtue with a balance, or a mean between excess and deficiency.
Happiness thus depends on a moral character, which requires the
virtues of courage, generosity, justice, and friendship. All of the
above, though, seems to be referred to an individual assessment
of the right set of goods and the just mean in the exercise of virtue.
And this is not as objective as it should be within a realist theory
of happiness, as the goods needed for one’s virtuous activity
depend on personal conditions.
Happiness As a (Neuro-Psychological)
State
The second sense of happiness is called “descriptive.” In fact, at
any time any person can be characterized by a position along
some dimensions that are not necessarily relevant for the person
in question. This second sense of happiness can be decomposed
into two levels: the classic one, which may be investigated
by means of direct subjective reports or through secondary
indicators of satisfaction—surveys that indicate, for example,
that Londoners are on average happier than Liverpudlians—and
the neuroscientific one, which has to do with the observable
and measurable activation of the brain areas found to be
associated with pleasure and states of well-being. This objective
and quantifiable method has sparked the idea of building a
“science of happiness,” both on the descriptive level and on that of
the increase in individual well-being by acting with various tools
on the relevant neuronal circuits (see Berridge and Kringelbach,
2011). I will call the first of these levels “subjective psychological
happiness” and the second “objective brain happiness.”
Subjective psychological happiness has long been the subject
of debate as for what lies beyond its intuitive commonsensical
meaning, i.e., that for which we have no difficulty in saying
whether we are happier today than yesterday or in ordering
on a scale the degree of happiness associated to specific events
or situations (ignoring for now the fact that there are strong
distortions of judgment related, for example, to the nearness
or the heterogeneity of the facts considered). This shows that
happiness is a concept easy to understand, that, however, has
raised the difficult question (even existential, as shown by
millennial wisdom and religious reflection) as to what are the
mental states that correspond to happiness (if there are any).
The main candidates for “descriptive” happiness, according
Haybron (2011), are non-welfare hedonism (physical or
immaterial pleasure, the latter being also, we now know, largely
mediated by the same brain mechanisms involved in bodily
sensations), life satisfaction theories and emotional state theories
(where the state is to be understood as positive). The last two have
to do with a disposition, an orientation toward the conditions
of one’s own life: what matters is not so much the experiences
that happen to us but the way in which we accept and evaluate
them, by emphasizing our emotional side in one case (thereby
also involving emotions at the cerebral and physiological levels),
while leaving room for a more thoughtful and rational judgment
in the other.
The hedonistic position implies that happiness corresponds to
the balance between the sensations of pleasure and pain, although
it is not considered that that balance should be the only concern
for each individual. On the other hand, the theories of “life
satisfaction” describe happiness as a favorable attitude toward
one’s life taken as a whole, a sort of global assessment that is
not only a theoretical or intellectual consideration, but means
embracing and asserting one’s life as such, in a way that may
be partly implicit and may or may not be accompanied by some
emotional features.
Finally, the emotional state theory does not consider
the feelings of pleasure but rather the constant emotional
background that accompanies us, which is a persistent tone and
is not subject to continuous deviations depending on individual
daily events. This is primarily a state of mind that we would
call “serenity” and “contentment,” unrelated to specific events or
situations. It’s something that, ultimately, one might consider to
be the opposite of anxiety and depression, emotional states that
are more easily identifiable (Haybron, 2008).
HAPPINESS AND REALISM
Even if happiness, as stated, may seem like an elusive state of
the individual, something private and therefore evasive of any
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objective analysis, in this paper I am examining attempts to
find operationalizable definitions and quantifications of it. In
this context, empirical studies began with the construction of
indicators and scales for measuring personal and inter-personal
happiness. It was also discovered that subjectively reported
evaluations are very often correlated with relevant objective
variables, such as friendship, physiological data, health and
longevity (still leaving open whether they are among the causes
of happiness—which is yet to be defined—or whether they are
part of the state called “happiness”).
This is where the element of realism comes into play, since
objective variables are mind-independent and intersubjectively
observable. If we abstract from the radically subjective sense—
so that everyone can say when and how one is happy in a sort
of Wittgensteinian private language in which nothing can be said
that is scientifically and philosophically interesting—it is possible
to introduce the criteria of science and naturalism so as to test if
and how their inherent realism is relevant in such a particular
context. There is indeed a long tradition that has theorized
the overwhelming superiority of the inner perspective, i.e., the
idiosyncratic and personal look at one’s individual happiness.
But the concept of happiness remains very complex with the
combination of internal and external elements that it implies.
Descriptive States and Prescriptive
Theories
It should be pointed out that in the discussion of happiness,
and particularly in its relationship with the realism/anti-realism
debate, we can distinguish between a descriptive level and a
prescriptive level. The first one says what happiness is and what
its cause is, while the second concerns the possible ways to
achieve happiness, going beyond the state in which one finds
oneself and identifying the key elements upon which to act.
As that of happiness, so far, has not been an exact science,
both areas are characterized by empirical approximations and
generalizations drawn from experiential accounts, regardless of
the fact that one can be “mistaken” about one’s state of happiness,
unlike what happens with the attribution of one’s subjective
phenomenal states.
Hedonism Explained by Neuroscience
However one philosophically defines hedonism and its place
in the economy of happiness, recent progress in the scientific
understanding of the physiological mechanisms of pleasure
seems to break down the boundaries between types of pleasures
usually held to be totally incommensurable (e.g., food and
intellectual achievements). This widens the perimeter of hedonic
states as a subset of happiness, through an at least partial
integration-overlapping with eudaimonic states. Hedonic states
are those that fall within the theory of happiness as well-being
and, in the descriptive states, as objective cerebral happiness.
Eudaimonic states are those referred to both by the desire theory
and by the objective list theory, namely the cognitive and moral
aspects that are part of a life considered good and significant
(the two dimensions, however, tend to correlate in subjective
measurements).
Pleasure is never made up of a simple feeling: it always needs
the active involvement of specialized brain systems responsible
for the hedonic coloring of individual sensations (Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2011)4. The activation of small portions of our brain
is what makes us pleased by the individual experiences that have
the ability to cause such cascades of electro-chemical processes.
These mechanisms, with different degrees of complexity, are
found throughout the animal kingdom, indicating that their
origin is filogenically ancient and evolutionarily adaptive. Beyond
food and sexuality, social interactions are also sources of pleasure,
as well as—it seems—the positive feelings coming from personal
or creative achievements5.
Although the feeling of pleasure can be unified, subpersonal
mechanisms in action constitute a complex structure composed
of several components of the brain, which with their selective
recruitment and their activation of different intensity give rise to
those that—at the phenomenal level—appear as hedonic states
of different origins and of different types. In fact, what cognitive
neuroscience seems to tell us with increasing accuracy is that
everything is mediated by the same processes and that pleasure
is a creation of the brain largely independent from the origin of
its stimulation6.
This fact implies that the apparent extreme subjectivity of
hedonic states—long believed to be due to the different (and
unfathomable) physiological response to an almost infinite
variety (both for quality and for quantity) of potentially enjoyable
elements—is no longer in contradiction with the objectivity
of the physiological response (in its translation at a conscious
level) of single individuals. This could be inferred from the
evolutionary explanation: if the perceived pleasure must serve
to guide adaptive behavior, foods rich in lipids, and glucose (the
rarest in the diet of our hunter-gatherer ancestors) must be those
that give to all the specimens the greatest pleasure, so that it acts
as an incentive and reward for the effort to get themost nutritious
and useful food in order to survive and thrive in the environment.
But the latest research has gone further. The first step was
the identification of the correlation between the activation of
different areas—evaluated with the tools of neuroimaging—
and behavioral indicators of satisfaction caused by specific
4Although it exceeds the possibilities and scope of this essay, the concept of
pleasure should also be restricted in amore precise way. To a first approximation, it
can be defined as the quality of our internal states (living beings have a continuous
flow of internal states) characterized by preferability, that is, by the wish for their
achievement or continuation.
5The central axis of the so-called pleasure circuit consists of the dopaminergic
neurons of the ventral tegmental area and its projections to the nucleus accumbens,
but the prefrontal cortex, the dorsal striatum, the amygdala and the hippocampus
are also involved (for the details, not yet fully understood, see e.g., Linden, 2011;
Bloom, 2010).
6One might want to consider a philosophically central theme, that of the
externalism of mental contents. For hedonic states, the issue seems to be less
pressing, but when it comes to beliefs the problem is unavoidable. If one adopts
the position that the contents of beliefs are related to a subject’s relation to her
environment, internalist perspectives are radically challenged (including Nozick’s
experience machine when it promises to faithfully reproduce real-life experiences).
However, if the proximate causes of behavior are locally supervenient in the brain
(as neuroscience seems to posit) the externalist objection is called into question.
It is not possible to develop this debate here, as it makes the discussion of the
relationship between realism and happiness even more complex.
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stimuli. An example, for animals and human infants, are
the facial expressions of happiness and the protrusion of the
tongue aroused by substances with a sweet taste. On the
contrary, bitterness induces expressions of disgust, grimaces,
head movements, and the expulsion from the mouth of the
substance ingested. In such cases, there is no cognitive mediation,
or learning (the child has not yet learned that it is not appropriate
to spit), but only the immediate and automatic reactions dictated
by the feeling that causes the activation of certain brain areas
related to chemical detection of the receptors placed on the
tongue.
A next step that has been taken is the hyperstimulation of the
brain areas thus identified so as to verify whether there is a causal
relationship and not solely a correlation between their activation
and a hedonic feeling. In rodents, microinjection of molecules
that mimic the neurotransmitters implicated in the transmission
of impulses in the areas subjected to the experiment have actually
led to a strengthening of the observable reactions of pleasure or
satisfaction after the administration of substances with a sugary
taste (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013).
This seems to indicate that the brain mechanisms are the final
and most important elements responsible for conscious hedonic
feelings, given that (as it was previously thought) in the same
situation and in the same specimens a sugar solution could have
caused greater or lesser satisfaction according to the endogenous
microstimulations. And, again, this shows how it is possible in
principle and, today at least in part, empirically viable to arouse
in the brain the same pleasure that would give us, say, a chocolate
bar or a hot bath, with a direct stimulation of the brain.
The precise identification of the areas involved in the
generation of conscious sensations of pleasure and the ability
to stimulate them with increasing accuracy, as well as the
measurement or at least the operationalization of subjectively
experienced pleasure, can be seen as an advancement toward
the arithmetic of pleasure suggested by Bentham. Pleasure, then,
seems to change from subjective and elusive to a completely
understandable process at the scientific level, with an objectivity
that, therefore, cannot be contested. Remember, however, the
possible objection linked to the still incomplete understanding of
the way in which the molecular processes translate into conscious
phenomenal sensations for the individual (the so-called qualia).
Futuristic scenarios (see Linden, 2011) indicate the possibility
of finely manipulating the brain circuits of pleasure: a person
who took advantage of such a device could experience the same
hedonic states as those elicited by stimuli coming from the
outside of her brain. On the other hand, philosophers had already
made the same mental experiment. Nozick (1974) has famously
conceived a device where people could come and experience all
the mental states corresponding to experiences in the outside
world.
Leaving aside the arguments that show how we cannot be
“brains in a vat” without realizing it (Putnam, 1981), Nozick
had knowledge at the time of writing that led him to claim that
there is something else that “we want more than our experiences”
and, in particular, “we want to do certain things, and not only
have the experience of them.” But according to contemporary
neuroscience there is no difference, at least potentially, between
remembering to have taken some action in the world, with the
associated feelings, and remembering a stimulation produced
directly into our brains.
In any case, here I am only referring to states of pleasure
and not to the whole life experience. The hedonic component
is therefore measurable and reproducible material, realistic in
terms of its scientific description, which identifies the causes and
effects according to the nomological regularities of biology (even
though biology is not an exact science). Happiness understood
as well-being resulting from pleasant experiences is therefore
fully part of the field of realist ontology independently from
subjective evaluation. It is a construction of our brain as a
material organ, which responds to stimulation of certain parts of
it (however they are produced) assuming different physical states
over time (t2) and which following stimulation with respect to
time (t1) is characterized by a different stimulation (or by no
stimulation at all).
One can therefore agree that hedonic states can be classified as
“realistic,” rooted as they are in an object (the brain) that is fully
part of the “furniture” of the world, in contrast to the strongly
subjectivist perspective which has always characterized them
as ineffable and mind-dependent. The realism of the hedonic
states thus described may be termed “internal” (in a peculiar
sense, which does not refer to other uses of the term in the
philosophical debate), as it regards modifications unique to the
individual brains. The status of other theories of happiness seems
to be different.
The Desire Theory
If that of hedonism is an internal realism, desire theory—
which concerns the obtaining of what we aspire to, rather
than the mere occurrence of certain physiological experiences—
has a character of “external” realism (again in a particular
sense, unrelated to earlier uses of the expression). In fact, the
states of satisfaction are anchored to states of affairs in the
world separate or independent from the individual, although
their evaluation as good/happy is partly subjective, related
to “culturalist” elements, i.e., rooted into a specific cultural
niche made up of consolidated habits and traditions. Think of
the distinction established by Dworkin (1993) between critical
interests (that is, general purposes even external to the self:
the well-being of children, the results of one’s work in relation
to the community and so on), as opposed to experiential
interests (related to momentary personal satisfaction although
not to the simple pleasure that we have called “instinctive”).
It appears that the former do not pass Nozick’s experience
machine test.
If the well-being of our children is what we want in a
particular way, we will definitely have a sui generis hedonic state
associated with the realization of this kind of well-being, which
can be simulated by the device that connects to our brain to
stimulate certain areas; but what we want is that our children
are in good health, that they are able to start a family and to
achieve their professional goals, that they do not suffer. And
we want these things to happen in the world and not in a
simulation that will give us the pleasant (for us) illusion that
they’re doing fine, while maybe they are dying in a hospital. In
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this case, it seems that there is a clear separation between the
implementation of possible (though real) states of hedonic brain
satisfaction and the appreciation of states in the outside world as
the conditions for happiness tied to the external realism of critical
interests7.
On the other hand, experiential interests are fully included
in the hedonistic theory of happiness, so that pleasure can be
aroused by external stimuli as well as by endogenous activations,
but the link with the states of satisfaction experienced
subjectively—with the exception of the cognitive-moral
component that we will consider later—does not necessarily
depend on the external states of the world, but rather on
the particular internal neuro-physical state (the absence of a
certain type of sensory receptors can deprive us of the intense
pleasure that a given food arouses in most of our fellow
human beings).
The Objective List Theory
The objective list theory, as I said, refers to the improvement
of human nature as the cause of eudemonia: a virtuous life
can give us well-being regardless of our personal dispositions,
as it refers to goods independent from subjective evaluations,
implicated by human nature itself. It is relevant here to recall
the objection that Nozick himself makes against the experience
machine.
A second reason for not plugging in is that we want to be a certain
way, to be a certain sort of person. Someone floating in a tank is
an indeterminate blob. There is no answer to the question of what
a person is like who has long been in the tank. Is he courageous,
kind, intelligent, witty, loving? It’s not merely that it’s difficult to
tell; there’s no way he is. Plugging into a machine is a kind of
suicide. It will seem to some, trapped by a picture, that nothing
about what we are like can matter except as it gets reflected in
our experiences. But should it be surprising that what we are is
important to us? (Nozick, 1974; p. 43).
The happiness that comes from being a certain type of
person has to do with the intersubjective—objective, external,
verifiable—recognition of some parts of our personality that
must result (at least in part) into recognizable actions or
affections. There is certainly the extreme case of the solitary
ascetic. But even if the virtuous life does not seek publicity,
it is still inserted into the reality of the world because,
according to Aristotle, it recognizes an external order to
follow (Aristotle, 2000).The objective list theory can also be
descriptive because, in the view of its advocates, there is an
inherent tendency in people to prefer certain goods and to
have cooperative attitudes toward their peers, in a virtuous
circle of individual integrity and social benevolence. What was
a philosophical reflection has now become evidence of empirical
and evolutionary psychology and cognitive neuroscience, thanks
7One could object that external conditions might seem here to be regarded as
constitutive factors of happiness. In fact, external conditions are constraints to
a realist notion of happiness, as opposed to a subjective one. One cannot be
“happy” if objective external conditions are not consistent with the realist notion of
happiness. Consequently, external conditions are causes and reasons of happiness,
since realist happiness is not the same thing as its conditions.
to the discovery of mirror neurons and brain circuits of
empathy.
Subjective Psychological Happiness
The description of happiness includes the life satisfaction
theory and the emotional state theory. They seem to be
mind-dependent, in principle detached from the states of things
external to the subject and, therefore, they can be defined as
interpretative judgments lying beyond objective facts (a position
à la Nietzsche). Obviously, psychological states have a cerebral
correlate and changes in brain states seem to affect (if not the
existential evaluation) at least the emotional state. It is known
since the dawn of mankind that psychoactive substances have the
ability to change one’s mood, also altering one’s evaluation of one’s
condition and of the states of the world.
It should be noted that “assessment” is not understood here
as a purely cognitive judgment that may be distorted under
the influence of drugs—such as the estimation of the width of
a room—but the emotional-cognitive appreciation of complex
situations, such as the desirability of a certain conduct or of a
certain existential situation: for example, whether to quit a job
in which one undergoes mobbing or not. The inability to make
important decisions on the part of individuals who have suffered
injuries to specific brain areas that govern the elaboration of
emotions—as shown in studies by Damasio (1994)—comes from
the lack of indicators of the salience of the alternatives provided
by the physiological emotional response.
On the other hand, if it is true that we now have highly
selective molecules to modulate the mood and, consequently, the
emotional state of a person, we still do not know exactly how
they work. Prozac, the psychiatric drug that defined a social era
(see Kramer, 2006), making depressed patients feel “better than
good” and paving the way to the age of “cosmetic pharmacology,”
increases the levels of the serotonin neurotransmitter available
between certain target synapses, but it does not seem that this
effect is sufficient to induce those changes of personality that
bring people under treatment to see their life in pink. Serotonin
reuptake inhibitors, however, are candidates to also affect life
satisfaction.
But what is relevant in the descriptive state of happiness-
psychological euphoria—beyond the substrate of “internal”
realism yet to be deciphered (and therefore not reproducible by
the experience machine, because it is different from the states
produced by hedonic pleasure centers)—is its deep irrealism.
This aspect is captured effectively in a recent novel that combines
literary sensitivity and scientific expertise. The protagonist of
Generosity by Powers (2009) fascinates those around her because
of her contagious happiness, which consists in a really good
mood (which can bemeasured by psychological assessment tools)
and in a totally positive look on reality. The joy of living in
Thassa Amzwar, a self-conscious and intelligent girl, appears
disconnected from her life history (her beloved parents were
killed, she had to leave her country because of the civil war, she is
an Arab immigrant in Chicago; albeit educated and multilingual,
she has uncertain prospects for her future, a classmate she
got close to tried to rape her...). Her amazing and contagious
optimism arouses the interest of some researchers, who discover
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that the secret of Thassa’s happiness is enclosed in a rare mutation
in her DNA. The discovery triggers collective hysteria in the
hope of creating a technique of genetic manipulation capable
of giving perpetual euphoria, while the young woman sees her
non-superficial joy waver for the first time.
The ability not to break down and not to fall into inaction
as a reaction to the events that affect us is certainly a valuable
adaptive resource. It is a result of many studies that people
have a mid-point of happiness they tend to come back to after
peak events, both positive and negative, such as winning the
lottery or surviving a serious car accident. At the present state
of knowledge, it is estimated that 50% of subjective well-being
is hereditary: such data emerged from studies on twins (cf.
Brickman et al., 1978; Fredrickson et al., 2013; Bhattacharjee and
Mogilner, 2014).
Nevertheless, those of “life satisfaction” and emotional state
are theories and conditions of happiness that can have a very high
rate of irrealism, understood as amind-dependent cognitive state,
which does not correlate with the objective facts of the external
world. This happens when one can be happy or sad facing the
same situation (for example, having lost a rewarding job and
not being able to find another one); and when the correlation
between the state of the world and one’s own subjective state looks
quite idiosyncratic, seeming wrong or dysfunctional to most
observers, (for example, if the servant declares himself happy to
be chained). Thus, the lack of realism about happiness can have
serious consequences on the objective quality of life, which are
different from the simple fact that it seems better to bemoderately
happy rather than mortally depressed (Oishi et al., 2007).
Prescriptive Theories
The topic of realism associated with the discourse on happiness
becomes burdened with practical consequences when we enter
the domain of prescriptive theories, that is, theories that advocate
a sense of happiness as better or preferable and indicate the
manner in which to achieve the highest and most enduring
states of happiness. The states of satisfaction that each individual
decides to pursue are, of course, the result of subjective judgment
(which could in turn be the effect of an objective cerebral
asset), with a non-idiosyncratic and non-relativistic component.
A meta-ethical discourse on happiness, however, is not my focus
here. I will therefore consider approaches that do not blatantly
violate the basic rules of the law and common ethical sensitivity.
Hedonism is the approach that sees happiness as equivalent
to pleasure. Empirically, today we might limit it (or perhaps,
better, extend it) to all the states generated by the pleasure areas
identified in the brain, whatever the stimulus (endogenous or
external) that causes them. Nozick’s experience machine is fully
part of the hedonistic recipes for happiness, just like drugs, as
long as they give us pleasure.
Is Realist Hedonism Also Naturalist?
Hedonism is a form of “internal realism,” because pleasure can
be identified and quantified with the experimental method much
more than a subjective feeling, while also being a subjective
feeling. Internal realism, however, is not necessarily linked to the
outside world; it can, indeed, lead to detachment from the world
and one’s own critical interests, if they are rooted in states of
external reality. The laboratory rat that keeps stimulating itself by
moving a lever that controls an electrode implanted in its brain
and those who compulsively seek inner satisfaction in food, sex,
or even in solipsistic intellectual gratifications are united by a
distancing from the states of the world beyond their own hedonic
inner reality—as evidenced by the fact that all of them would
probably agree to be connected to Nozick’s experience machine.
Provided that naturalism (the notion that all existing things
are physical and are as described by science) is not prescriptive
and, on the contrary, it has a hard time finding its place in
the physicalist ontology for its normative dimension (“What
should I do?” “Who is a better poet, Chaucer or Donne?”),
hedonism as a quantifiable description of brain activations
that give pleasure can be defined as naturalistic realism.
In other words, scientific naturalism is only committed to
describing nature and reality as they are, not to finding the
way nature and reality should be—since there are not principles
or values detectable by science in accord to which establish
what happiness should be—or what behavior one should adopt
(i.e., the so-called normative dimension). (Obviously, scientific
naturalism is not the only naturalism on the market, and
other forms of “liberal” naturalism can accommodate moral
values and rules; but those forms of naturalism are often
disagreed with).
Irrealism in Positive Psychology
“Have these two thoughts ever the readiest in all emergencies:
one, that ‘the things themselves reach not to the soul, but stand
without, still and motionless. All your perturbation comes from
inward opinions about them.’ The other, that ‘all these things
presently change, and shall be nomore.’ Frequently recollect what
changes thou hast observed. The world is a continual change; life
is opinion.” Thus says Marcus Aurelius inMeditations (4:3), and
seems to echo the Buddha when he says: “All mental phenomena
have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as their chief; they
are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness
follows him like a shadow that never leaves him” (Dhammapada,
verse 2). According to Haidt (2006), the most important idea of
folk psychology is contained in these two quotes: world events
affect us only through the interpretation that we give of them,
so if we can control the interpretation, we can also control our
world. So much so that a guru of folk psychology has coined one
of his 10 laws so that it echoes Nietzsche’s position: “There is no
reality, there is only perception (Haidt, 2006).
Handbooks of self-esteem and self-help have the specific aim
of changing these interpretations so as to make sure that the
individual becomes happy not by acting on her situation in the
world, but by adapting to the world with a change of perspective
that makes her understand the positivity of their condition, once
it has been better considered. Thus, in an example given by Haidt,
there often comes a time when a person worn out by years of
resentment, pain and anger realizes that (say) her father did not
hurt her directly when he abandoned their family, but merely left
the house. It is the reaction to the event which gives rise to pain—
according to this reading—so that if we abandon this reaction, the
fact itself cease to be a source of suffering.
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Giving different judgments on facts is not the same thing as
denying reality, but it is often a strategy that can get close to
denial if moral judgment is strongly deformed, or when there
are no specific reasons to try to change our ordinary intuitions
about reality instead of changing the states of the world that seem
negative or dysfunctional. It is a different thing compared to what
is called “average affective style,” a way of emotionally assessing
events that happen to us that, based onwhat Haidt effectively calls
“cortical lottery,” can be a constant bad mood making existence
a heavy burden. In the long term, meditation, psychotherapy, or
medications such as Prozac can be effective on the affective style.
But here we return to internal brain realism, because it is possible
to think that all these interventions, mediated or direct, act on
some neural circuit deputed to the development of emotional
evaluations8.
The position of at least part of positive psychology is quite
different, as it is strongly tempted by the irrealist perspective.
Ehrenreich (2009, cf. also Dawes, 1994) pointed out that positive
thinking distorts reality, so as to only see its favorable factors,
or simply denies it. This trend can encourage people to submit
to adversity with a benevolent disposition (“cancer makes you
better, it is an opportunity to change”) and blame themselves
for the blows of life (“if you do not recover from cancer it
is ultimately because of your negativity,” as if cancer were a
psychological condition). If we have cancer we must seek proper
care, which sometimes is not available, and a stoic or optimistic
attitude can be surely useful and admirable. But in front of other
non-unavoidable events, such as social injustice and political
oppression, we may end up passively accepting unjust situations
as a result of the pursuit of inner happiness. Seeking “life
satisfaction” in spite of the external states around us seems to
amount to an illusion that distorts the evaluation of oneself
and reality.
Even the so-called humanistic psychology of Abraham
Maslow and Carl Rogers, influenced by the subjectivist-
spontaneistic cultural climate of the 1960s, has contributed to
an optimistic relativism that promotes inner realization and the
growth of one’s inner potential, with the idea of harmonizing the
self with the cosmos and not vice versa (see Milton, 2002). Some
simplifications of anti-psychiatry have led to believe that there are
no objective diagnoses and that inner needs precede, and may be
manifested regardless of, the external situation.
As I said, it is not in question whether happiness should
be the goal of existence, or whether we should rather prefer a
“good” or “truthful” life, adhering to mind-independent realism.
Even in the pursuit of one’s own well-being, to consider the
relevance of both internal states and the external states of the
world is important. One could ask whether the happiness of the
wise à la Epictetus, who knows how to cut himself off from the
worries and cares of the world, is a form of unconscious irrealism
driven by false beliefs, induced or self-inflicted, or a form of
selfish solipsism, which favors one’s own inner satisfaction at the
expense of a possible engagement in the world.
8It should be noted, however, that the “artificial euphoria” produced by the new
generations of psychoactive drugs has been described as a “dishonest happiness”
because of the escape from reality that it implies (see President’s Council on
Bioethics, 2003, cap. 5).
The recent trend that combines positive psychology with
research on the neuroscientific bases of specific mental states can
be placed in this area. It started from the benefits of contemplative
practices and got to the “contemplative neuroscience” also
promoted by the Dalai Lama, who first lent himself as a subject
of direct study (Ricard et al., 2014). The discovery of the benefits
of meditation is in fact associated with neuroscientific advances
that have shown that the brain can be transformed, and brain
circuits can be rewired, by the experiences to which it is exposed.
In this case it comes to internal experiences, by definition
disconnected from the external ones, which are considered
sources of disturbance and anxiety. It’s mainly about “focused
attention” and “mindfulness.” The first leads the meditator to
concentrate on the in-and-out cycle of breathing. The second
entails observing sights, sounds and other sensations, including
internal bodily sensation and thoughts, without being carried
away. Mindfulness makes a person “aware of what is happening
without becoming overly preoccupied with any single perception
or thought, returning to this detached focus each time the
mind strays” (Ricard et al., 2014; p. 42). Neuroscientists have
tried to measure mindfulness meditation and found that it
produces decreased sensitivity to pain, as well as a reduction
in symptoms of anxiety and depression. The neurocerebral
study of people who have a long experience of meditation,
especially people of the Buddhist religion, has shown that they
are able to sustain a Particular EEG patterns, in particular
the so-called high-amplitude gamma-band oscillation and phase
synchrony at between 25 and 42 Hz. The subjects have different
EEG traces (Lutz et al., 2009). Also, it seems that mindfulness
training can decrease the volume of the amygdala, a brain area
considered crucial for the development of feelings of fear and
anxiety. In this way, it is shown that the “meditation produces
significant changes in both the function and structure of the
brains of experienced practitioners” (Ricard et al., 2014; p. 45).
This is important because, for the supporters of mindfulness
and positive psychology in general, “people differ in their
levels of happiness, and these differences are associated with
different underlying characteristics” (Davidson, 2005), “emotion
regulation plays a key role in modulating these differences in
happiness,” and “happiness can be regarded as the product of
skills that can be enhanced through mental training, and such
training can induce positive changes in the brain”(ib.) (cf. Lewis
et al., 2014).
The consequence is that happiness can be increased by acting
on the above-mentioned skills through a proper and systematic
training (Ricard, 2006). This goes in the direction of positive
psychology (Seligman, 2011), for which personal flourishing
(which replaces happiness) by definition has no external criteria
to decide what accomplishment is valuable to someone. This
leads to an individualist trend that only marginally considers
the happiness of the group. The risk is to undermine, in the
long run, the very bases of social coexistence and rewards,
which are the preconditions for any real flourishing. In fact,
if we detach the pursuit of subjective happiness from external
intersubjective criteria, the result could be forms of quietism
weakening social bonds and collective cooperation, which are
necessary for the maintenance of the material and social standard
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we have today. Alternatively, such pursuit of happiness might
lead to a gap between individual values and purposes able to
interfere with the possibility of having stable bonds and relation
at a community level.
The latest stage of this trend has been reached by recent
devices promising to make their users’ happier (Davies, 2015).
For instance, one of them, thanks to sensor-laden headband
which monitors the neuronal activity, should help improve the
emotional state of the user, thereby training the brain for empathy
and composure. But to “mechanicize” happiness through cerebral
manipulation, albeit freely chosen, will inevitably lead to
irrealism with regards to the external states of the world and
to (more or less) objective criteria of happiness understood as
more than an EEG pattern. In fact, these devices might be used
to avoid the ups and downs of real life, which help us find
our way in the social and physical world. The ultimate effect
may be an estrangement from one’s context and acquiescence to
the given situation, with no incentive to change dysfunctional
situations for one-self and for others or to improve one’s own or
the others’ conditions. This is a situation of extreme irrealism,
according to my definition, even though happiness as it is
subjectively experienced and neurophysiologically detected is
here perfectly “real.”
The Realism of the Theory of Capabilities
A theory of well-being that aims to avoid the trap of irrealism
is that proposed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, called
“theory of capabilities.”9 The overall objective of this approach is
a society in which everyone is treated as worthy of respect and
put in a position to really be able to live in a humane way. The
key point is that below a certain level of capability a person is not
able to live a truly human life (Nussbaum, 2011). It is a theory that
does not want to be culturalist. Therefore, while some individuals
may be say to be happy in their condition (e.g., baby-prostitutes
in the slums of Calcutta, as some studies indicate), they will not
live a truly human life: in those cases, they deceive themselves
about their happiness, through a representation of it that is not
realistic, maybe because they do not have sufficient knowledge or
the right tools.
The list of capabilities is not based on subjective impressions
of satisfaction, but on objective conditions: it is those human
capabilities that give dignity and well-being, and can serve the
general purpose of every human life, regardless of the specific
goals people aspire to achieve. Basic capabilities, however, are
not just tools; they are intrinsic values to give a properly human
character to existence. For Nussbaum they include: life, health,
bodily integrity, senses, imagination, and thought, emotions,
practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, control over one’s
environment. Their identification is carried out by means of
a widespread and negotiated consensus, which refers both to
the universalitic idea of humanity and to mind-independent
elements that play a real role in people’s lives.
It can be argued that the welfare of truly human existence in
the perspective of basic capabilities is not happiness as we usually
9Those of Nussbaum and Sen are properly theories of human development, but to
the extent that they aim to promote overall well-being of the person they may fall
within the scope of our theories of happiness.
understand it, which is the state that stands out above the usual
average of our states. As already mentioned, a person can be
said to be satisfied with their life or appear to be so to many
observers even if they happen to be in a condition that seems
(according to the observers or to shared criteria) unpleasant,
painful or not emotionally satisfying. These people are well below
the minimum threshold of capabilities that the theory sets for
humanity, not even for happiness. The idea therefore is that
in the absence of alternatives or opportunities we tend to a
psychological settlement that spares us excessive suffering, but
that we could come to a “real” and better condition, according
to criteria that once experienced we would share: this would give
us greater satisfaction and “more real” happiness rather than the
mere result of “interpretations.”
In any case, it is interesting to note that, with an independent
path, Williams (1985, ch. 9) has also come to recognize a kind
of realism in the idea that there might be a theory of human
nature, based on the knowledge provided by the social and
physical sciences, capable of guiding a reflection on what leads
to flourishing. That is, while maintaining the relativism of values,
there can be objectivity in the scientific sense (objectivity that
creates a convergence as a mirror of reality) about the belief that
a certain kind of social world is the best one in which human
beings can live.
CONCLUSION: DEGREES OF REALISM
Contemporary neuroscience seeks to explicitly describe with
its quantitative methods (including predictability) an elusive—
although somehow operationalized—concept like happiness, not
only in its hedonic component, but also in the eudaimonic
one (which is believed to also stem from brain processes).
It is a powerful operation by which what has always been
considered a stable condition, predominantly psychological,
pervading consciousness, and deriving from the total satisfaction
of the inclinations and desires of the human being, is reduced
to a strictly naturalistic condition. This is a good chance for
a renewed confrontation between realism and subjectivism-
culturalism—that is, exactly the comparison that new realism
proposes to establish.
As I have tried to argue, there are different degrees of realism
related to different conceptions of happiness. The first is what
I have called “internal realism,” which is also naturalistic, being
fully objective and mind-independent (leaving aside here the
non-secondary element of qualia). It is closely related to the
functioning of our brains so, in this sense, it is independent of
the states in the outside world, which are often responsible for
feelings of pleasure. It may be pointed out here that the evolution
of the hedonic brain structures has certainly been driven by
a feedback coming from the environment, since pleasure is
originally a signal of the “appropriateness” of the specific
relationships between the body and, for example, some type of
food or the chosen sexual partner. As emerges with Nozick’s
experience machine, though, such a connection is not necessary
and, indeed, the most promising scientific perspective is that of
simulating and increasing pleasure by only acting on the brain.
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The second level of realism is called “external,” and has as a
prerequisite the states of the world, which are per se the cause
of happiness or unhappiness. This would still be the case even
if one were to discover in the near future the internal “mental”
mechanism that makes it possible for such states of happiness to
be in any way comparable to that of pleasure in the classic sense.
A third type of realism related to happiness is a metaphysical one,
of a natural objective order, mind-independent, and reachable
with non-naturalistic faculties. This type of realism is typical of
rationalist theories.
There is also a form of irrealism about happiness, namely
the one represented by a very wide and ancient tradition that
identifies eudaimonic states with detachment from the world and
the focus on oneself (but not in the sense of rationalist theories),
in an attempt to passively escape the pain that the world can
cause. The maximum degree of irrealism is found in all those
prescriptive theories suggesting that one should change one’s
opinion on reality in order to represent the world in subjectively
positive terms, regardless of the actual states of the world. The
same holds for the kind of happiness that, according to empirical
psychology, many people claim to experience even while being
forced to live in conditions of hardship, misery, and exploitation.
According to a strictly naturalistic approach, this may be due
to the “cortical lottery”: depending on their genetic asset, some
individuals have a higher average level of happiness then their
fellow people, to which they return after each peak, be it positive
or negative.
This reading effectively indicates the difference between
internal and external realism: if for some it is internal brain
mechanisms that determine happiness no matter what happens
“out there,” there is an obvious disconnection between the reality
of the biochemical structure of the brain and the reality of
the states of the world external to the subject in question.
(Of course, there are general cognitive resources to understand
this disconnection). A test of realism with respect to these
situations is given by theories such as that of capabilities or
that of “primary goods” by Rawls (1971), which don’t consider
subjective judgments, but rather some kind of minimal shared
human flourishing. Such flourishing is very different from that
of positive psychology, because the latter is largely dependent on
the subjective emotions of the individual, while that described by
the capabilities theory is anchored to objective criteria resulting
from an intersubjective rational weighting, which is subject to
confirmations and corrections in time.
In the end, scientific realism seems to contradict the well-
known saying that “everyone knows what’s good for them,”
understood as the impossibility for others to assess the degree of
happiness that other people experience. Nonetheless, individuals
should be able to choose for themselves what type of happiness
is the most appropriate. However, this choice is not morally
indifferent, as it affects what kind of life we want to live (and
perhaps also what kind of person we want to be) as well as the
fate of others, as I have tried to show so far. Knowing the different
degrees of realism of the idea of happiness one adheres to or
publicly promotes is therefore strongly relevant and is surely one
of the tasks of the psychological and philosophical reflection.
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